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THE EASTERN DIMENSION  
OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY 
ORGANIZATION 
The article has been dedicated to the issue of the eastern dimension of NATO, 
with a special consideration of the evolution of NATO’s policy in this regard, the 
extension of the organization, as well as bilateral relations with Russia, Ukraine 
and Georgia. In the article, the circumstances of the cooperation between 
NATO and those countries have been discussed, the instruments and mecha-
nisms of such cooperation, as well as the evolution of the Euro-Atlantic policy of 
Ukraine and Georgia. The article also describes the consequences of the annexa-
tion of Crimea and the conflict in the eastern Ukraine, as well as their impact on 
NATO’s policy. Therefore the decisions made at the NATO summit in Warsaw, 
directed towards improving the security of the eastern flanks, and Russia’s posi-
tion in this matter are also analysed.
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The conflict in Ukraine has led to a complete change of geopolitical situation in the 
East European region as well as the level of stability and regional security. The conflict 
indeed influenced also NATO policy, facing new challenges and the necessity to pro-
vide adequate answers to the existing threats. The conflict in Ukraine in a significant 
way shaped NATO policy towards its Eastern partners as well as bilateral relations with 
Russia, Ukraine and Georgia. Therefore, in this article both the Eastern dimension of 
NATO will be discussed, as well as the transformation of the North Atlantic Alliance 
in the face of new challenges and threats, as well as decisions made to strengthen secu-
rity of the member states and their consequences in terms of relations with NATO’s key 
Eastern partners.
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CONDITIONS OF COOPERATION 
After the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact were dissolved in 1991, the North Atlan-
tic Alliance had to redefine its functioning under new international conditions and de-
fine its new objectives and targets. There were also some suggestions that would indi-
cate the necessity of dissolving these organizations, especially in the situation when the 
Warsaw Pact – the main enemy of NATO during the Cold War – collapsed. However, 
considering new threats and the key responsibility for the safety of the member states, 
NATO has gone through the process of internal transformation and has adjusted its se-
curity strategy to the changed international conditions and new geopolitical situation.
One of the most important consequences of the dissolution of the Soviet Union was 
that new independent states emerged which similarly to the former Warsaw Pact satel-
lite states were willing to start cooperation with the North Atlantic Alliance. NATO 
was also interested in expanding its relations with the East. Such cooperation was firstly 
expanded by establishing the North Atlantic Cooperation Council at NATO’s sum-
mit in Rome in 1991.1 Initially, it consisted of the former satellite states of the So-
viet Union; after dissolution of the USSR, new post-Soviet independent republics also 
joined in. Over time, some of the states contributing to the Council’s work, mainly Po-
land, Hungary and then Czechoslovakia, started to express their willingness of a closer 
cooperation with NATO as well as a possibility to join the organization in the future. 
The Alliance responded to the aspirations claimed by those states during the summit in 
Brussels in January 1994 by presenting a special program called Partnership for Peace. 
The program was directed towards closer cooperation between NATO and the in-
terested countries took a series of various actions towards strengthening military co-
operation, as part of Individual Partnership Action Plans specially negotiated with 
each country. However, Partnership for Peace did not guarantee future membership in 
NATO for the countries taking part in the program, therefore it was criticized by those 
countries which were insisting on a closer integration as well as joining NATO in the 
future. 
Despite the critical assessments addressed to the Partnership for Peace, Poland, Hun-
gary and the Czech Republic eventually joined the program. From that moment, the 
Partnership for Peace has become an important element of collaboration between the 
interested countries and the North Atlantic Alliance, as well as a mechanism of influ-
ence on the Eastern partners in terms of security and defense sector related reforms. 
The program also contributed to the development of advanced military cooperation 
between the interested countries, what has led to narrowing interoperability of their 
armies with the Alliance’s forces. Therefore it should be highlighted that even though 
the Partnership for Peace did not aim at bringing NATO’s membership for its respec-
tive countries, it considerably extended the mutual military cooperation. Therefore, it 
1 “North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)”, NATO, 30 January 2017, at <http://www.nato.int/
cps/en/natohq/topics_69344.htm>, 13 June 2017.
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should be emphasized that it thereby contributed to the first expansion of NATO in 
1999, as a result of which Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic joined the Alliance. 
A political decision to expand NATO to the new countries in the Eastern and Cen-
tral Europe has also influenced the intensification of discussions on NATO establishing 
new forms of cooperation with Russia as well as the remaining countries in this region. 
In this aspect, a key role was played by Ukraine interested in developing cooperation 
with NATO, and later expressing its willingness to apply for membership in the Alli-
ance. A similar process in terms of priorities in the foreign policy and security has been 
experienced by Georgia which started to express its aspirations towards membership 
in the Alliance. Relations with those countries are crucial for the Eastern dimension of 
NATO, therefore further below, there will be presented an analysis of them, their in-
terdependency, as well as consequences of NATO’s relations with Russia, Ukraine and 
Georgia for the geopolitical situation in the regions of Eastern Europe and Southern 
Caucasus.
NATO’S RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA 
It should be highlighted that during the post-Cold War period, the relations between 
NATO and the Russian Federation have experienced a significant transformation. In 
the 1990s we can speak about some form of cooperation between NATO and Russia. 
Its confirmation was Russia’s participation in the activities of the North Atlantic Co-
operation Council as well as the joining of the Partnership for Peace program. An im-
portant element shaping bilateral relations was also the signing of the NATO-Russia 
Charter on 25 May 1997 that mainly described the rules and shape of cooperation be-
tween two partners. A significant event which developed bilateral relations was also the 
creation of a special mechanism of cooperation which was the NATO-Russia Council 
established in 2002.
It should be indicated, however, that despite developing various forms and shapes of 
cooperation, the Russian Federation has consequently criticized NATO for the expan-
sion process and accepting new countries from the Eastern and Central Europe. A mat-
ter of such criticism from Russia was also the fact of strengthening cooperation with the 
interested post-Soviet countries, mainly with Ukraine and Georgia. After the Revolu-
tion of Roses in Georgia (2003), as well as the Orange Revolution in Ukraine (2004), 
respective new governments decided to clearly identify their priorities in foreign policy 
and security, as well as expressed their willingness to become members of the North 
Atlantic Alliance. Such actions were met with sharp criticism from the Russian Federa-
tion, considering them as a breach of its national interests as well as the sphere of influ-
ence in this region. During the meeting of the NATO-Russia Council, on the margins 
of the summit in Bucharest, Putin sharply criticized the Alliance as well as Ukraine and 
Georgia for considering the perspective of membership for those countries and grant-
ing a special program, Membership Action Plan. NATO did not decide to take such 
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steps, nevertheless it should be mentioned that the recent crises in relations between 
NATO and the Russian Federation were related to the events concerning Ukraine and 
Georgia. Freezing of the cooperation between NATO and the Russian Federation hap-
pened as a result of the Georgian-Russian war in 2008, as well as Crimea’s annexation 
in 2014, and the ongoing conflict in the Eastern regions of Ukraine.2
After the Georgian-Russian war, NATO decided to suspend formal meetings of 
the NATO-Russia Council, as well as partially suspended its cooperation with Russia. 
The Alliance has been consequently supporting also Georgia’s territorial integrity and 
called on the Russian Federation to withdraw from recognizing Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia as independent countries.3 However, within the next months NATO has soft-
ened its stance. Despite Russia not meeting the above condition during the summit in 
Strasbourg/Kehl, the leaders decided to change the political strategy towards Russia. It 
has been agreed that the political cooperation should be developed and various forms 
of practical cooperation between the partners should be reinstated.4
Subsequently, one of the most important aspects was the cooperation between 
NATO and the Russian Federation as part of ISAF mission, as well as actions to 
strengthen Afghan security forces. A significant role was to train Afghan services as 
well as other countries of the Central Asia, dealing with tackling drug smuggling. The 
next priority actions between NATO and the Russian Federation would be as follows: 
 – fighting global terrorism,
 – Cooperative Airspace Initiative,
 – cooperation in terms of ballistic missile defence (Theatre missile defence/ballistic
missile defence),
 – cooperation in terms of arms control,
 – cooperation on non-proliferation of weapons,
 – military-to-military cooperation,
 – cooperation in terms of fighting against modern piracy,
 – cooperation in terms of transparency of the ongoing reform as well as defence sec-
tor,
 – cooperation in terms of defence and logistics industries,
 – cooperation in terms of fighting the consequences of civil disasters,
 – scientific cooperation.5
The above cooperation between NATO and the Russian Federation at the practical 
level has been developed regardless of the unfavorable rhetoric of Russia’s authorities 
related to the Alliance’s deepening cooperation with Ukraine and Georgia. The next 
crisis in terms of relations between NATO and Russia was caused by Ukraine and the 
2 “NATO-Russia Relations: The Background”, NATO, May 2017, at <http://www.nato.int/nato_static_ 
fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2017_05/20170517_1705-nato-russia-en.pdf>, 13 June 2017. 
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 “Relations with Russia. Key Areas of Cooperation Prior to April 2014”, NATO, 16 June 2017, at 
<http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50090.htm>, 16 June 2017.
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direct reasons of freezing of the relations was annexation of Crimea at the beginning of 
2014, as well as the conflict that originated in the Eastern part of Ukraine.
After the referendum in Crimea organized by Russia, the North Atlantic Council 
on 17 March 2014 adopted a special statement referring to this event. In the document, 
NATO highlighted that it does not approve the so called referendum, considering it to 
be illegal and violating international law. It was stressed that NATO does not approve 
the results of the voting organized by Russia, either. At the same time NATO called 
on Russia to take some actions directed towards de-escalating the situation and ending 
the military actions towards Ukraine. They also called on Russian authorities to meet 
its international commitments as well as to return to dialogue as well as searching for 
a peaceful way of solving the situation. Russia was also asked to refrain from making 
a decision to annex Crimea, which would be an obvious breach of the United Nations 
Charter.6 
Despite the above calls, on 18 March 2014, the President of Russia decided to an-
nex Crimea as part of the Russian Federation and on that day the respective documents 
were signed by the representatives of the peninsula. As a  result of the annexation of 
Crimea, NATO decided to take further steps in terms of bilateral cooperation. This 
matter was one of the most important topics at the meeting of NATO foreign ministers 
who on 1-2 April 2014 gathered in Brussels. NATO made a decision at that time to sus-
pend all practical cooperation with Russia, at the same time keeping the mechanisms of 
communication with this country in case of potential discussion on the deepening con-
flict related issues. Therefore the possibility to organize sittings of the NATO-Russia 
Council has been kept at the ambassadors’ level as well as the communication as part of 
the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.7
Calls from NATO to start negotiations and withdraw from the aggressive policy 
did not bring about any result and the situation was additionally worsened by the be-
ginning of a military conflict in the Eastern parts of Ukraine.8 In one of the articles 
published at that time the Secretary General of NATO, Anders Fogh Rasmussen even 
claimed that as a result of the actions taken, Russia was no longer considered a partner 
and started to be perceived as an enemy.9
6 “Statement by the North Atlantic Council on the So-called Referendum in Crimea”, NATO, 17 March 
2014, at <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_108030.htm>, 13 June 2017.
7 “Statement by NATO Foreign Ministers”, NATO, 1 April 2014, at <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/
natolive/news_108501.htm>, 14 June 2017; “NATO-Russia Council”, NATO, 16 June 2017, at 
<http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50091.htm>, 16 June 2017; “Measures Following 
NATO Ministers’ Decision to Suspend All Practical Cooperation with Russia”, NATO, 7 April 2014, 
at <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_108902.htm>, 14 June 2017.
8 “NATO Secretary General Concerned about Escalation in Eastern Ukraine”, NATO, 13 April 2014, 
at <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_109148.htm>, 14 June 2017.
9 A.F. Rasmussen, “De-escalation Starts on the Ground”, NATO, 13 April 2014, at <http://www.nato.
int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_109102.htm>, 14 June 2017.
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Russia consequently rejected any criticism, accusing NATO of offensive policy and 
violating its sphere of influence. Such rhetoric was a reflection of a big tension in the 
bilateral relations as well as their practical freezing.
The annexation of Crimea as well as the conflict in the Eastern Ukraine have led 
to a serious discussion in NATO on a security threat of some member states from the 
Russian Federation. Therefore a key topic before the planned NATO summit in Wales 
was NATO’s reaction to this situation. Gathered in Newport on 4-5 September 2014, 
the leaders decided to accept a special program called Readiness Action Plan as well as 
referred to the actions taken by Russia. The leaders of NATO states and governments 
stated that as a  result of those actions the Euro-Atlantic security has faced a  crucial 
moment. It was highlighted that Russia’s ‘aggressive’ actions towards Ukraine are a big 
challenge for the whole European security system. It was also indicated that, with the 
growing threats in the Middle East as well as in South Africa, Russia’s actions can be-
come a serious threat and have long-lasting consequences for security, both in the Euro 
Atlantic region as well as in the whole world.10
During the summit NATO also unambiguously condemned Russia’s military in-
tervention in the Eastern parts of Ukraine. The leaders once again called on Russia to 
withdraw its forces from the Ukrainian territory and to end its illegal occupation of the 
Crimea Peninsula. They called on Russia again to the adherence to the basic principles 
of international law as well as the international commitments that they have previously 
accepted. The leaders also stressed that NATO will not decide to accept the annexa-
tion of Crimea illegally applied by the Russian Federation. NATO also emphasized the 
need to solve the conflict only by way of peaceful negotiations and highlighted that all 
signatories of the Minsk agreement have to meet the commitments they have made.11
Similar arguments on the threats from the Russian Federation the Alliance were 
put forth at the next summit in Warsaw in July 2016. In the final document issued at 
that time, the leaders stressed that the situation of security at NATO’s borders has been 
deteriorating and the Alliance has to face many threats directed towards the member 
states. 
At the same time, it was highlighted that the source of regional instability are the 
aggressive actions taken by Russia that have infringed the current Euro–Atlantic secu-
rity system. The key actions of the Russian Federation that have had an impact on this 
process are as follows: 
 – illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol,
 – violating sovereign borders by force,
 – deliberate destabilization of Eastern parts of Ukraine,
 – conducting extensive military exercises and maneuvers that would contradict the
Vienna Document,
10 “Wales Summit Declaration. Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meet-
ing of the North Atlantic Council in Wales”, NATO, 5 September 2014, at <http://www.nato.int/
cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm?mode=pressrelease>, 14 June 2017.
11 “Relations with Russia. Response to the Russia-Ukraine Conflict”, NATO, 16 June 2017, at <http://
www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50090.htm>, 16 June 2017.
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 – Russia’s provocative military actions in the vicinity of NATO’s borders, both at the
northern section, as well as eastern and southern one,
 – conducting irresponsible and aggressive nuclear rhetoric,
 – continuous violation of the airspace of NATO’s member states,
 – intervention in Syria, keeping a significant military presence in this country as well
as supporting Bashar al-Assad’s regime.12
In the further part of the document NATO highlighted its lack of interest in con-
fronting Russia and that it does not consider Russia as a  threat. At the same time, 
NATO declared its willingness for further discussions and the resumption of coopera-
tion, providing Russia will restrain from its aggressive policy. NATO stressed, however, 
that will not agree to any compromise regarding basic values on which the Transatlantic 
Community has been built.13 
THE RUSSIAN PERCEPTION OF NATO
Considering the current tension and divergent interests of both actors, Russia has 
consequently been accusing NATO of violating the statements adopted at the end of 
the Cold War that were related to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. It also has re-
proached NATO for conducting aggressive military policy as well as violating Russia’s 
sphere of influence. Such Russian approach has been reflected in many of the recently 
adopted strategic documents, relating to this country’s security policy.
In a military doctrine adopted on 25 December 2014, the Russian Federation re-
ferred directly to its relations with NATO. It was highlighted that the North Atlantic 
Alliance is still considered as the most important threat to Russia’s security. Russia also 
accused NATO of violating the basic norms and principles of the international law. In 
the document, it was also stressed that NATO has been conducting an aggressive policy 
towards Russia and takes actions directed to weaken its growing position at the inter-
national arena. It was also indicated that, for this purpose, NATO attempts to carry out 
a coup d’état in Russia and to topple legitimate authorities.14
In the military doctrine, as one of the most important military threats for the Rus-
sian Federation was also strengthening the military potential of NATO and the member 
12 “Warsaw Summit Communiqué. Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the 
Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw 8-9 July 2016”, NATO, 9 July 2016, at <http://
www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm?selectedLocale=en>, 14 June 2017.
13 Ibid.
14 “Военная доктрина Российской Федерации (вредакцииот 2014 г.)”, Министерство иностранных 
дел Российской Федерации, 26 December 2014, at <http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/official_ 
documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/589760>, 14 June 2017; “The President 
Approved New Edition of Military Doctrine”, President of Russia, 26 December 2014, at <http://
en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47334>, 14 June 2017. See also “The Military Doctrine of the 
Russian Federation. Approved by the President of the Russian Federation on December 25, 2014”, 
Embassy of the Russian Federation to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 
29 June 2015, at <http://www.rusemb.org.uk/press/2029>, 14 June 2017.
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states. Placing new military infrastructure near Russian borders was also considered as 
a threat. It was emphasized that a relevant threat for the Russian Federation is also tak-
ing actions directed towards further expansion of NATO and accepting new members.15 
A  matter of NATO and the way Russia perceived this organization was also in-
cluded in the newest Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation The document 
was adopted based on a decree issued by the president Vladimir Putin on 30 November 
2016. In the concept, it was highlighted that the ‘systemic problems’, that have been 
accumulated during the last 25 years are a result of geopolitical expansion conducted 
both by the North Atlantic Alliance as well as the European Union.
Russia stressed that this expansive policy along with the fact that NATO and EU 
refused to create common European security and cooperation framework, have led to 
a serious crisis in their mutual relations. The Russian Federation also stated that the 
containment policy adopted by the United States and its allies has been weakening 
both regional and global stability. In the document, it was emphasized that political 
and informational pressure, as well as the economic one, continuously put on the Rus-
sian Federation by the eastern countries, also affect the level of security. It was indicated 
that such policy negatively impacts cooperation that is necessary in order to effectively 
fight many threats of a modern world, as well as in a long-lasting perspective will affect 
the interests of both sides.16
In the concept, Russia also expressed its interest in a further development of its rela-
tions with NATO. In this matter, however, it was stressed that NATO will have to meet 
some relevant conditions. First of all, it was indicated that NATO would have to ex-
press its willingness for equal partnership, as well as respect basic principles and norms 
of the international law. They also highlighted the need for cooperation and taking 
specific actions in order to create common space, peace, stability, and security of the Eu-
ro-Atlantic area. Russia also concluded that some particular countries should restrain 
from strengthening their own security at the expense of other partners. 
In the document, Russia criticized the policy of further extension of NATO, as-
sessing it as further ‘expansion’ of the organization. They also criticized strengthen-
ing military infrastructure in the member states of NATO bordering Russia, as well as 
deepening cooperation with the states located in its neighborhood. The authorities of 
the Russian Federation stressed that such actions are the infringement of the principle 
of indivisible security, and they not only lead to deepening existing differences on the 
European continent but also are a reason of creating new tensions and confrontations.17
From the above analysis, it appears that the Russian Federation perceives NATO as 
one of the most important threats for its own security. A similar approach in this matter 
has been presented by NATO, which, considering Russia as a threat, decided to strengthen 
15 “Военная доктрина Российской Федерации…”
16 “Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (approved by President of the Russian Federation 
Vladimir Putin on November 30, 2016)”, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 
1 December 2016, at <http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher 
/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/2542248>, 14 June 2017.
17 Ibid.
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the eastern flank of the organization. In conclusion, it should be stated that, currently, the 
NATO-Russia relations are de facto frozen, and the possibility to change this situation 
will depend mainly on the further course of the military conflict in the eastern Ukraine.
In conclusion, after 1991, the Russian Federation responded very vividly to the ex-
pansion of the North Atlantic Alliance, perceiving this process as the most important 
and direct threat to its own security. An extension of the organization to additional 
member states located in the east was considered by Russia as violation of its sphere 
of influence, and – by re-gaining its international position – more and more explicitly 
opposed the process. The Georgian-Russian war taking place in August 2008, as well 
as the Ukrainian-Russian conflict, can be considered as an expression of such policy. 
Starting military actions can be perceived as Russia’s reaction resulting from closer col-
laboration between Ukraine and Georgia with NATO, as well as the westward-looking 
direction in the foreign and security policy of those countries. A crucial part of Russian 
actions was also – as indicated by the Baltic states – using provocation and movements 
with the aim to interfere with the internal affairs, and creating threats to their internal 
security. The situation of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia is completely different in this 
regard, as they are members of NATO, however, as it was already mentioned, the mem-
ber states – considering the direct threat to their security – during the most recent sum-
mits, decided to confirm the Alliance commitments and to strengthen this territorial 
part of the North Atlantic Alliance. 
UKRAINE-NATO RELATIONS
After gaining independence, Ukraine has been expressing its interest in developing 
comprehensive relations with NATO. The authorities in Kiev decided to join the 
North-Atlantic Partnership Council, and subsequently Ukraine became an active 
member of the Partnership for Peace program. Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic policy after 
1991 has significantly evolved and resulted from a complicated internal situation in 
the country and the international conditioning as Ukraine was a country that in 1990s 
did not express any willingness to become a member of NATO. Contrary to Russia, it 
did not oppose the planned extension of NATO to the new countries from the Eastern 
and Central Europe. They did express, however, their concerns on their own security. 
Therefore, in 1997, they signed NATO-Ukraine Charter that was directed towards 
deepening mutual cooperation. 
The year 2002 can be considered a  breakthrough in Ukraine’s policy towards 
NATO, when the authorities in Kiev declared their intension to apply for a member-
ship in this organization. The above decision, however, was not motivated by the na-
tional interests of Ukraine. It was President Leonid Kuchma’s instrumental reaction on 
the ongoing internal crisis as well as Ukraine’s international isolation.
A decisive shift to the Euro-Atlantic policy happened after the Orange revolution 
and when Viktor Yushchenko came to power in 2005. The new president clearly stated 
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breaking with the multi-vector policy and announced that the priority for Ukraine’s 
foreign policy and security is integration as well as becoming a member of NATO and 
the European Union in the future. Under Yushchenko’s presidential rule, Ukraine sig-
nificantly deepened its cooperation with NATO, although was not offered any plau-
sible membership perspective. The issue of membership was discussed at the NATO 
summit in Bucharest in 2008, and at that time the representatives of the Alliance did 
not decide to include Ukraine and Georgia in the Membership Action Plan (MAP).
The next decisive moment for Ukraine-NATO relations came in 2010, when the 
presidential elections were won by Viktor Yanukovych, standing for restricting the co-
operation with NATO. Therefore, the government of Ukraine declared its resignation 
from attempting to become a  member of this organization. They also decided that 
Ukraine will remain a neutral and non-unitary country.
REORIENTATION OF THE EURO-ATLANTIC POLICY OF 
UKRAINE
It should be stressed that the annexation of Crimea as well as the war in the eastern re-
gions of Ukraine have led to a complete revision of the security policy of Ukraine. As 
a result, Ukraine reassured that its priority in the foreign and security policy is to be-
come a member of NATO. In regard to a complete change of national and international 
circumstances, the government of Ukraine also decided to adopt a new version of stra-
tegic documents regarding the country’s security policy. During the recent years, the 
authorities of Ukraine accepted a review of four key documents that serve as the basis 
of the country’s defense policy.
Table 1. Key documents on the security policy of Ukraine after 2014 
Document Date of adoption
National Security Strategy of Ukraine 26 May 2015
Military Doctrine of Ukraine 24 September 2015 
Concept for the Development of the Security and 
Defense Sector 14 March 2016 
Strategic Defence Bulletin 6 June 2016 
State Program for the Building and Development 
of the Armed Forces of Ukraine until 2020 22 March 2017
Source: own study based on source documents. 
First of the key documents adopted by Ukraine after the annexation of Crimea and 
starting military actions in the eastern regions was the National Security Strategy on 
26 May 2015. In the document, it was highlighted that the revolution of dignity has 
15POLITEJA 5(50)/2017 The Eastern Dimension of the North Atlantic…
provided an opportunity for Ukraine to build a new country and new principles of re-
lations with its citizens, based on such values as freedom and democracy. It was empha-
sized that Euromaidan was a result of a social protest against corrupted and infringing 
basic civil rights government.
In the further part of the strategy, it was indicated that Russia, willing to contradict 
the European perspective of Ukrainians, decided to occupy Crimea and started mili-
tary aggression against Ukraine in its eastern parts. It was stressed that Russia’s aim is 
to destroy the basics of the international order built after World War II, as well as de-
structing the unity of a democratic world. In the further part of the document it was 
indicated that the threats from Russia are of a long-term nature. Therefore, it was high-
lighted that Ukraine has been forced to take all necessary steps in order to strengthen 
its defense and perform necessary changes in the security policy.18
One of the key aspects of the upcoming changes was therefore the matter of co-
operation with NATO. It was emphasized that developing a special partnership with 
NATO is a priority for Ukraine’s security policy. It was indicated that one of the basic 
aims of this policy should be to gain full interoperability of the armed forces of Ukraine 
with the armies of the NATO member states. It was also announced that some consis-
tent actions will be taken in order to fulfill the criteria necessary to gain a membership 
in NATO in the future.19
The next key document describing security policy is the Military Doctrine of 
Ukraine that was adopted on 24 September 2015. The military doctrine is a specifica-
tion of the above-mentioned strategy. In the document, again, there was an indication 
to a matter of cooperation with NATO. It was highlighted that the priority for Ukraine 
is to fully accept NATO standards, implement a reform of the armed forces based on 
those standards, as well as achieve full interoperability with the armies of the member 
states of NATO by the year 2020.20
Some concrete actions in terms of such priorities were included in the next two 
documents that were adopted by the government of Ukraine. First of them was the 
Concept for the Development of the Security and Defense Sector on 14 March 2016. 
In this document, the Ukraine Security and Defense Council decided that the Ministry 
of Defense up to two months would prepare a project of Strategic Defense Bulletin.21 
18 “Указ Президента України Про рішення Ради національної безпеки і оборони України від 
6  травня 2015 року ‘Про Стратегію національної безпеки України’”, Законодавство України, 
26 May 2015, at <http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/287/2015>, 14 June 2017.
19 Ibid.
20 “Указ Президента України Про рішення Ради національної безпеки і оборони України від 
2 вересня 2015 року ‘Про нову редакцію Воєнної доктрини України’”, Законодавство України, 
29 September 2015, at <http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/555/2015/page>, 14 June 2017.
21 “Указ Президента України № 92/2016 Про рішення Ради національної безпеки і оборони 
України від 4 березня 2016 року ‘Про Концепцію розвитку сектору безпеки і оборони України’”, 
Офіційне інтернет-представництво Президента України, 14 March 2016, at <http://www. 
president.gov.ua/documents/922016-19832>, 14 June 2017.
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Based on the guidelines, such document on 6 June 2016 was accepted by the president 
Petro Poroshenko.22 
Based on the above documents, Ukraine has completely changed its security policy 
and started implementing key reforms in the security and defence sector. There were 
still some ongoing works, however, related to the complex changes in terms of the ar-
my’s functioning. Eventually, on 22 March 2017, the State Program for the Building 
and Development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine until 2020 was adopted.23 The most 
important provisions of this document are confidential, however, from the information 
from the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine it can be explained that the planned reforms 
are directed towards achieving five strategic aims, that is:
 – improving the effectiveness of managing the army,
 – innovating and improving the system of defence planning,
 – increasing transparency and usage of army resources,
 – increasing effectiveness and army capability,
 – innovating armed forces and delivering effective country defence, its sovereignty, as
well as territorial integrity,
 – creating a consistent logistic system as well as efficient organization of medical help
for soldiers,
 – professionalization of the armed forces of Ukraine and creating a special system of
military reserve force.24
It should be stressed that quite recently it has been decided to use the next means
of cooperation between NATO and Ukraine. Thanks to it, Ukraine has been receiv-
ing support from NATO during the implementation of reforms of the country’s secu-
rity and defense sector. The matters of cooperation in this regard were one of the most 
important topics at the NATO summit in Warsaw in 2016. During the summit, a spe-
cial support program for Ukraine has been adopted, called Comprehensive Assistance 
Package (CAP), being a relevant mechanism of a deepened, bilateral cooperation.25
During the summit, NATO again expressed its support for Ukraine’s sovereignty as 
well as its territorial integrity. The leaders also highlighted that Ukraine, as a sovereign 
22 “Указ Президента України Про рішення Ради національної безпеки і оборони України від 
20 травня 2016 року ‘Про Стратегічний оборонний бюлетень України’”, Офіційне інтернет-
представництво Президента України, 6 June 2016, at <http://www.president.gov.ua/documents 
/2402016-20137>, 14 June 2017.
23 “Указ Президента України № 73/2017 Про рішення Ради національної безпеки і оборони 
України від 29 грудня 2016 року ‘Про Державну програму розвитку Збройних Сил України на 
період до 2020 року’”, Офіційне інтернет-представництво Президента України, 22 March 2017, 
at <http://www.president.gov.ua/documents/732017-21498>, 14 June 2017.
24 “Державна програма розвитку Збройних Сил України до 2020 року визначає стратегічні 
напрямки військової реформи”, Міністерство оборони України, 16 May 2017, at <http://www.
mil.gov.ua/news/2017/05/16/derzhavna-programa-rozvitku-zbrojnih-sil-ukraini-do-2020-roku-
viznachae-strategichni-napryamki-vijskovoi-reformi/>, 14 June 2017.
25 “Joint Statement of the NATO-Ukraine Commission at the Level of Heads of State and Government, 
9 July 2016, Warsaw, Poland”, NATO, 9 July 2016, at <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_
texts_133173.htm?selectedLocale=en>, 14 June 2017.
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country, has a right to independently make decisions regarding its future and priorities 
in terms of foreign and security policy.26
It should be mentioned, however, that defining a strategic plan of membership in 
NATO by Ukraine has not changed significantly the Alliance’s position in this matter. 
During the annexation of Crimea and the conflict in the eastern parts, NATO clear-
ly supported Ukraine and sharply criticized the Russian Federation, at the same time 
suspending all practical cooperation with this country. Precarious geopolitical circum-
stances and the increasing number of threats in the region did not change, however, 
the negative attitude of some of NATO’s member states towards the perspective of 
Ukraine’s membership. Therefore, Ukraine, in the near term, can only count on con-
tinuing a deepened form of cooperation, however, without the possibility to join the 
organization. 
NATO-GEORGIA RELATIONS
Georgia is the next post-Soviet country that has experienced the evolution from a loose 
cooperation with the Alliance to the willingness to apply for a membership in NATO. 
Similarly to Ukraine, in the 1990s, Georgia was interested in developing the coopera-
tion, what was proved by taking part in the North-Atlantic Partnership Council, as 
well as the Partnership for Peace program. A significant change in Georgia’s policy to-
wards NATO happened during the government of Eduard Shevardnadze. This politi-
cian announced Georgia’s intention to apply for a membership in NATO. It should be 
stressed, however, that following these declarations, no specific actions were taken that 
would be directed towards a deepened integration with NATO. 
The Revolution of Roses in 2003 and Mikheil Saakashvili‘s coming to power were 
of key importance in this aspect. The politician declared that a key direction of Geor-
gia’s foreign and security policy will be integration with the western structures, as well 
as applying for membership in NATO and the European Union. During the tenure of 
Saakashvili, Georgia and Ukraine have been tightly cooperating in this matter. As it was 
already mentioned, during the NATO summit in Bucharest, the Alliance made a politi-
cal decision that Georgia and Ukraine will become members of NATO in the future. 
Despite such declaration, NATO did not decide, however, to grant them the MAP. 
It should also be highlighted that after Saakashvili’s tenure, when the opposition 
came to power, Georgia has kept its Euro-Atlantic course. The authorities in Tbilisi 
still stand for joining NATO and are interested in a tight cooperation in terms of the 
country’s security and defense sector reforms. 
It should be indicated that during the NATO summit in Warsaw, for the first time 
the NATO-Georgia Commission had its sitting at the level of Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs. During that time, the Head of Georgia’s Diplomacy Department, Mikheil 
26 Ibid.
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Janelidze clearly confirmed that Georgia is interested in a further extension of bilateral 
cooperation, and joining the North-Atlantic Alliance in the future.27 
NATO, however, confirmed that the decisions made at the summit in Bucharest in 
2008 are still valid, and Georgia will become a member of this organization in the fu-
ture. They also announced to consequently support the reforms in the security sector 
and the functionality of Georgia’s armed forces. The key aspects of this cooperation 
are annual national plans including specific actions of changes (the Annual National 
Program), as well as the Substantial NATO-Georgia Package adopted at the summit in 
Wales in 2014. An important means of cooperation is also The Defence and Related 
Security Capacity Building (DCB) Initiative, the Partnership Interoperability Initia-
tive, The Joint Training and Evaluation Centre functioning in Georgia, as well as Geor-
gia’s contribution in NATO’s Response Force and taking part in a Resolute Support 
training mission in Afghanistan.28
The above analysis shows that during the past couple of years the cooperation be-
tween NATO and Georgia has significantly deepened, and NATO’s support towards 
the reforms of the security sector pursued by the Tbilisi authorities has been strength-
ened. A key role in this aspect has been played by Georgia, which, despite the change of 
authorities in this country, has kept priority directions of foreign and security industry, 
as well as has still been in favor of deepening the cooperation with NATO and gaining 
a membership in this organization in the future.
***
After the dissolution of the USSR, NATO’s eastern policy that has been shaped by 
the changing international circumstances and the geopolitical situation in the region 
of Central-Eastern Europe and Southern Caucasus, has significantly evolved. At that 
time, a few vital changes in the process of shaping relations with the Russian Federa-
tion, Ukraine, and Georgia took place. A key factor impacting such cooperation in the 
1990s was the decision on extending NATO and accepting the countries that during 
the cold war were under the Soviet sphere of influence. Russia sharply criticized such 
decision accusing NATO of expansionist actions and violating stability in the region. 
Similar approach was presented by the Russian Federation during the second extension 
of NATO, as a result of which the post-Soviet republics have been accepted to the or-
ganization. 
It is worth stressing, however, that despite divergent interests, there were different 
forms of cooperation and actions between NATO and Russia, taken to strengthen in-
ternational security. Within the next years, Russia has consequently criticized, however, 
the integration of Ukraine and Georgia with NATO, as well as their willingness to join 
the organization. This matter was one of the most important factors that have recently 
been influencing the cooperation between NATO and the Russian Federation. The di-
27 “Joint Statement of the NATO-Georgia Commission at the Level of Foreign Ministers, 8 July 
2016, Warsaw, Poland”, NATO, 8 July 2016, at <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts 
_133175.htm?selectedLocale=en>, 14 June 2017.
28 “Warsaw Summit Communiqué…”; “Joint Statement of the NATO-Georgia Commission…”.
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minished interest in maintaining bilateral relations has been triggered firstly due to the 
Georgian-Russian war, and after a few years, a similar situation happened due to the an-
nexation of Crimea and the ongoing conflict in the eastern parts of Ukraine. 
Considering different interests, as well as the lack of perspective to peacefully regu-
late the conflict in Donbas, it can be stated that, in the foreseeable future, it will not 
come to a  breakthrough in the relations between NATO and Russia. They will still 
be characterized by a huge tension and bilateral lack of trust, as well as further actions 
taken by both sides directed towards strengthening their own military potential, being 
a key element of a deterrent policy.
It should be stressed that a  significant role in terms of the eastern dimension of 
NATO has been played by the cooperation with Ukraine and Georgia. The policies 
pursued by those countries towards NATO have gone down a similar road and initially 
they were interested in a loose cooperation, its deepening, and subsequently, gaining 
membership. It should be emphasized, however, that there has been no consensus in 
this matter among the member states. Therefore, considering the circumstances of such 
cooperation, the geopolitical situation in the region, as well as Russia’s approach to-
wards the process of the extension of NATO, it can be stated that, in the nearest future, 
we should not expect any change in the approach of the member states towards the ex-
tension. Therefore, NATO’s relations with Ukraine and Georgia will be oriented only 
towards further extension and deepening practical aspects of the current cooperation.
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